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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DANIEL E. MURRAY*
INTRODUCTION *
The relatively few domestic relation laws enacted by the 1957 Florida
Legislature will be discussed under the various headings of this article. Those
bills which, in most cases, met a timely demise will be discussed in this
section. The reader may feel that an inordinate amount of discussion is
devoted to bills which failed of enactment. However, the writer believes,
based upon the records of the last three regular sessions, that these bills
will be resurrected, in one guise or the other, in the next session.
It is submitted that the legislature wisely defeated a measure' which
provided that divorce suits brought against non-resident defendants could
only be brought in the county where the plaintiff resided or the cause of
action accrued. Vhat difference does it make if the plaintiff desires to
bring an action in some county other than his own? It is submitted that
this is a frequent practice of plaintiffs to escape the embarrassment of
having all the details of the complaint published in local newspapers. One
bill2 would have permitted the circuit court to relinquish jurisdiction to
the juvenile court of portions of pending and adjudicated cases dealing with
custody and support of children; another bill3 provided that in the event
of conflicting orders, involving child custody, the order of the circuit court
would prevail, but that juvenile judges could, in cases of emergency, issue
orders binding until reviewed by the circuit court in which the case origi-
nated. What is the wisdom of dividing a case into portions? If these bills
became law, perhaps every case would be tried twice, once in the circuit
court in order to decide the question of divorce, again in the juvenile court
to determine the question of child custody and support. It is submitted that
most chancellors will admit that their decisions regarding the custody of
children are influenced, to some extent, by the conduct of the parents vis a vis
each other. To deprive the juvenile courts of this testimony would
force him to decide a case with an incomplete knowledge of the facts. In
*Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Miami.
*For a few of the many law review articles on domestic relations published in the Uni-
versity of Miami Law Review (former Miami Law Quarterly) and the University of
Florida Law Review during the last two years see: Adoption-Right to Inherit upon
Readoption, XI M.L.Q. 140 (1956); Contracts-Antenuptial Agreements-Public
Policy, XI M.L.Q. 143 (1956); Trowbridge, Domicle Problems of "Winter Residents,"
XI M.L.Q. 375 (1957); Torts: Husband's Liability to Wife for Prenuptial Personal
Injury, X Univ. of Fla. L. Rev. 105 (1957).
1. Companion Bills, ll.B. No. 44, 11. 481, S.B No. 625, 36th Regular Session,
florida (1957).
2. H.B. No. 778, 36th Regular Session, Florida (1957).
3. H.B. No. 1149, 36th Regular Session, Florida (1957).
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order to overcome this defect, the parties would have to try the case again
before him.
Another bill4 would have permitted the circuit court to transfer alimony
as well as support cases to the juvenile court for enforcement of orders.
Vhat connection with a juvenile court alimony has is beyond the writer's
understanding. It would appear that the juvenile courts are zealously attempt-
ing to build an empire. If the legislature is determined to curtail the power
of the circuit courts in domestic matters, perhaps the proper way is to
create domestic relations courts which would have jurisdiction over every
facet of marital cases, leaving to the juvenile courts jurisdiction limited to
delinquent children.
Another bill] 5 would have deprived notaries of their authority to sol-
emnize marriages. If this bill were enacted, all marriages would have to be
performed by a minister of the gospel or a judicial officer.
The legislature wisely defeated two bills6 which would have made divorce
decrees interlocutory for a period of sixty days. Most lawyers agree that when
the final hearing has been held, and the parties have castigated each other's
conduct sufficiently, it is somewhat late to hope that time and delay will
develop a reconciliation.
Another measure 7 would have amended section 856.04 of the Florida
Statutes by increasing the penalty from one year to not more than three
years for desertion and withholding of support of children by a mother or
father. Apparently, the effect of this bill would be to make certain that
the wife and children would be without support for an additional period
of two years while the father was incarcerated!
Along with the puerile bills that were defeated, two worthwhile meas-
ures were also defeated. In the first,8 a parent would have been allowed
to institute annulment proceedings where his child, under the age of
sixteen years, was married without the parent's consent; in the second,9
common-law marriages would havc been abolished and prohibited after
January 1, 1958, This bill further provided that all common-law marriages
contracted prior to that date would have to be registered with the county
judge within one year thereafter. According to press reports, this bill was
defeated because the legislature feared that it would work an undue hardship
upon our colored population. If the legislature had read the case of Chaachou
v. Chaachoua° (among others) it would soon realize that the common-law
marriage rule creates more problems than it solves.
4. H.B, No. 1105, 36th Regular Session, florida (1957).
5. H.B. No. 214, 36th Regular Session, Florida (1957).
6. Companion Bills, H.B. No. 47 and S.B. No. 63, 36th Regular Session Florida
(1957).
7. S.B. No. 604, 36th Regular Session, Florida (1957).
8. H.B. No. 1104, 36th Regular Session, Florida (1957).
9. 7B No. 41 36th Regular Session, Florida (1957).10. 73 So.ld 830 (Fla. 1954), Modified on Rehearing, 92 So.2d 414 (1957).
1958]
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MARRIAGE
Common law marriages.-During the last two years the court decided
only two cases dealing with common-law marriages. In the first case, the
court held that a common-law marriage had not been proved; the parties
entered into a meretricious relationship in 1949 which continued for several
years until temporarily interrupted by a marriage of the alleged wife to a
third person and a subsequent divorce from him. She did not change her
bank account, driver's license, social security card or other documents to
reflect the alleged marital status. Since this relationship was conceived mere-
triciously, she had the burden of showing the transition from concubinage
to marriage, which she failed to do. In the second case,12 which had been
before the court previously, the court quashed a lower'court order which held
the parties to be husband and wife and remanded for further testimony even
though a prima facie case had been proved by the wife. The decision was
apparently predicated upon the fact that much confusion and delay had
ensued and justice required a final factual determination.
Presumption of the validity of a second marriage.-In a workman's
compensation proceeding,' 8 a woman proved that she had married a workman,
now deceased, in Georgia in 1938 and that they had lived together until
1948, when the husband left her and never returned. She testified that she
had never been served with divorce papers and that she had not secured
a divorce. Her attorney testified that he searched the public records of Dade
County, Florida, and that no divorce proceedings appeared therein. The
Deputy and the full Industrial Commission held that she, by her testimony,
overcame the presumption of the validity of an alleged subsequent marriage
of her husband to another woman. The court reversed and held that the
presumption of the validity of a second marriage is one of the strongest
presumptions known to law, and that the burden of overcoming it rests
upon the person attacking its validity; in this case the first wife would
necessarily have to prove that she exhaustively searched the public records
(bureaus of vital statistics) of Georgia and Florida to show that a divorce
had never been granted to her husband.
ANNULMENT
In Mahan v. Mahan 4 an alleged wife filed for an annulment stating that
she was so intoxicated that she did not know that she had been married
until the day following the marriage. The alleged husband answered that
he could neither admit nor deny the allegations of the complaint because
at the time of the alleged marriage he also was so intoxicated that he could
11. Jordan v. Jordan, 89 So.2d 22 (Fla, 1956).
12. Chaachou v. Chaachou, 92 So.2d 414 (Fla. 1957).
13. 'reel v. Nolen Brown Motors, Inc. 93 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1957).
14. 88 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1956).
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not even state whether he was married to the woman. The facts showed no
cohabitation of the parties after their reason returned. The court overruled
the chancellor who had denied an annulment, stating:
it cannot be doubted that if the party, at the time of entering
into the contract, is so much intoxicated as to be non compos
mentis, and does not know what he is doing, and is for the time
deprived of reason, the marriage is invalid; but it is not invalid
if the intoxication is of a less degree than that stated-AI
(emphasis added.)
JURISDICTION, DOMICILE AND VENUE FOR DIVORCE
In an apparent effort to curb the alleged divorce mill "industry" the
legislature increased the residence requirements for divorce from ninety days
to six months'8 and provided that no testimony on the merits should be
taken in divorce suits for a period of thirty days after the cause is at issue
"except for good cause at the discretion of the judge."'" It is the opinion
of the writer that the legislature was tilting at windmills in enacting these
statutes. When the legislature finally realizes that the divorce "disease" is
essentially a sociological psychological, moral, and religious problem, it,
perhaps, will seek to find the basic causes and their cures.'8
ESTOPPEL BY JUDGEMENT AND RES JUDICATA As A
BAR TO FURTHER ACTIONS, VACATING OF DECREES AND APPEALS
Estoppel by judgment and res judicata.-The court decided three cases
involving the effect of foreign decrees asserted as a bar to Florida actions.
In the first case the court seemed to hold that a husband's suit for divorce,
based upon the wife's desertion and her habitual indulgence in a violent
and ungovernable temper, would be barred under the theories of res judicata
and estoppel by judgment. The wife pleaded two Massachusetts' decrees,
one granting her separate maintenance based on the husband's fault and the
other dismissing the husband's complaint for divorce based upon the wife's
alleged cruel and abusive treatment and her alleged violent and ungovernable
temper.' 9 In the second case the court held that a New York decree granting
the husband a divorce from bed and board on the ground of abandonment
does not bar the wife's action for divorce in Florida on the ground of habitual
intemperance because the actions are entirely different; therefore there was
15. Id. at 547.
16. FLA. STAT. § 65.02 (1941), as amended by c. 57.44, S.B. No. 64, 36th Regular
Session, Florida (1957)
17. FLA. STAT. § 65.20 (1941), as amended by c. 57-258, S.B. No. 63, 36th Regular
Session, Florida (1957).
18. See Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce And The Problem of Marriage Stability,
9 Vand. L. Rev. 633 (1956); Bradway, Divorce Litigation And The Welfare of the Fam-
ily, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 665 (1956); MeCurdy, Divorce-A suggested Approach With Particu-
lar Reference to Dissolution For Living Separate and Apart, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 685 (1956);
Freund, Divorce Law Reform, 19 Modem L. Rev. 573 (1956) (British).
19. Carducci v. Carducei, 82 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1955).
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no res judicata or estoppel by judgment.20 In the third case, a New Jersey
separate maintenance decree conclusively adjudicating that the husband
was at fault in the separation of the parties, which occurred in 1951, estopped
the husband from obtaining a divorce in Florida based upon the alleged
desertion commencing with the original separation in 1951, and also upon
mental cruelty which primarily consisted of the same desertion. The court
pointed out that if the husband made a bona fide offer of reconciliation
after that date, which was rejected by the wife, the husband might allege
a desertion commencing with the rejection. 21
Effect of divorce decree prior to recordation.-In a case of first im-
pression, the court held that where a divorce decree merely dissolved the
marriage and did not provide for any other relief it was effective from the
time it was signed, not from the time of recordation; hence, when the
husband died within minutes after the decree was signed, but before it was
recorded, the marriage was dissolved and his alleged widow had no claim
to his large estate. The law is that no action may be taken on a final decree
until it is recorded, that is, the final decree is effective as a basis for sub-
sequent proceedings (as distinguished from dissolution of the marital status)
only when recorded. 2"
Petition for re-hearing as tolling the time foa" an appeal.-For the sake
of uniformity, the court held that the timely filing (within ten days) of
a petition for re-hearing in chancery tolled the time for filing an appeal in
the same manner as does a motion for a new trial on the law side of
the court.23'
Vacating of decrees.-In a decision, which re-affirmed the holding in
the Lorenz case,24 the court held that it was improper for a chancellor to
vacate a final decree of divorce merely because a divorced wife sent the
chancellor two letters to the effect that she lied about her residence when
she obtained the divorce. No suit was properly brought to attack the solemn
decree and the proceeding ex mero motu was wholly -irregular; therefore
there was no foundation for the decree setting aside the divorce. 25
GROUNDS AND PROOF FOR DrvoRcE
Cruelty.-When the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant had
been guilty of extreme cruelty, because of a lack of corroboration, a divorce
was denied even though the parties had been separated twenty years and
the chancellor felt that the parties ought to be divorced. The supreme court
20. Horn v. Horn, 85 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1956).
21. Field v. Field, 91 So.2d 640, Fin. 1956).
22. Berkenfield v. Jacobs, 83 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1955).
23. Ganzer v. Ganzer, 84 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1956).
24. State ex rel. Lorenz v. Lorenz, 149 Fla. 625, 6 So.2d 620 (1942).
25. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 92 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1957).
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rejected the thesis of the plaintiff that a divorce would be "practicable"
under the circumstances on the ground that the dissolution of marriage was
not to be taken lightly and the authority of the court was limited by the
proof of the parties.2 6 It seems strange to the writer that we perpetuate
our Anglo-Saxon system of law which demands that the winning party
must satisfactorily besmirch the other in order to obtain a divorce. If the
parties can not live together as man and wife, why should the law continue
the legal existence of the marriage when it does not exist in fact? The
laws of Nevada and Cuba allow the dissolution of a marriage for incom-
patibility of character; Peru recognizes the ground of hatred; Uruguay
permits divorce if it is the will of the wife, provided she expresses the
desire three times in six months; and the former Russian Code of 1924
permitted divorce upon the simple desire of either party.27 Our system
would seem to make the separation more bitter and, in many cases, force
the parties to resort to perjury. In a later decision, in accord with the
above case, the court reaffirmed the rule" and held that a divorce could
not be granted on the un-corroborated testimony of one party.29
Extreme cruelty as a ground for divorce is relative; hence, when a
husband constantly criticized the actions of his wife, caused her to feel she
lived in a constant aura of criticism which induced asthmatic attacks, and
filed an un-founded suit for divorce against her, the court held the ground
was sufficiently proved.30 -BI
Desertion.-In a very interesting case, involving many evidentiary prob-
lems, the court held that wilful, obstinate and continued desertion had
been proved. The wife testified that her husband left her and she produced
two witnesses who, although never having met the husband, testified that
no man had lived with the wife for over a year. The court stated that: 2
From the testimony of the corroborating witnesses there follows
only one reasonable, and indeed inescapable, inference which is
that Mr. Lear was guilty of having lived apart from his wife and
neglected his marital duties for a period greater than one year.
An inference of this character is by law elevated for the purpose
of further inference to the dignity of an established fact. It may
independently, or together with other established facts, become a
predicate for a further inference, contrary to the general rule that
one inference may not be superimposed upon another. . . . This
inference so dignified, considered in connection with the evidence
26. Straughter v. Straughter, 87 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1956).
27. Millis, Cuban Divorce Law, 3 M.L.Q. 269 (1949).
28. It was established in 1924 in the case of Dean v. Dean, 87 Fla. 242, 99 So.
816 (1924).
29. Holmes v. Holmes, 95 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1957).
30. Grossman v. Grossman, 90 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1956).
31. The case of Collins v. Collins, 88 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1956) involving charges and
counter-charges is not discussed in this article because the writer feels it was not worth-
while.
32. Lear v. Lear, 95 So.2d 519 (Fla. 1957).
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as a whole, gives rise to the further inference that such desertion
was wilful and obstinate, for otherwise Mr. Lear would have
returned and resumed his marital obligations. . .. 33
Procedure on appeal.-A motion to affirmn the decree on appeal will
be sustained by the supreme court under rule 38 of the Florida Supreme
Court Rules of Practice where there is 'competent substantial evidence to
support the chancellor's findings of extreme cruelty and desertion.
4
AUIMoNY, SUPPORT AND PROPERTY RIGTs IN
DIVORCE AND SEPARATE MAINTENANCE DECREES
Because both the right to alimony and the amount thereof are primarily
based upon the facts of each case, the writer has been forced to include
the pertinent facts of each case and he begs the indulgence of those
readers who may expect to read abstract "principles of law."
The court decided three cases which, to the writer, seem somewhat
inconsistent in result. In West v. West 5 the court affirmed an alimony
award of twenty-five dollars per month from a husband who was eaming
$335.00 per month. When one considers that the wife was permanently
disabled in an accident and that her doctor's bills amounted to approxi-
mately $800.00 per year, one is forced to agree with the dissenting view
that:
In this case had the Chancellor denied alimony entirely it would
have come with better taste, but a mere pittance of twenty-five
dollars per month indicates to me that the Chancellor was follow-
ing literally the Longino case rather than actually giving her an
award based on her need and her husband's ability.80
In Newman v. Newman 7 the court held it was error for a chancellor
to refuse to award any alimony to the wife when the facts showed that
the parties were married sixteen years; the wife was forty-eight years old and
in poor health; the husband was receiving $132.00 per month pension and
owned several thousand dollars worth of government bonds, while being
owed approximately $4,000.00 on a loan; and that it was the husband's
actions which caused destruction of the marriage. What is the real difference
between no alimony and twenty-five dollars per month, except that the
latter pittance will prolong the wife's starvation agonies a few more days?
In the cause ceI6bre of Astor v. Astor,38 the wife left the husband after
six weeks of marriage. The husband was well endowed with this world's
goods, having an estate worth $4,750,000.00, with a net income in 1954 of
33. Id. at 521.
34. Trobaugh v. Trobaugh, 81 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1955).
35. 86 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1956).
36. Ibid.
37. 94 So.2d 841 (Fla. 1957).
38. 89 So.2d 645 (Fta. 1956).
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$63,000.00; he spent $238,000.00 during 1954 for "personal expenses." The
chancellor, having serious doubts about the wife's sincerity awarded her
twenty-five dollars per week; the supreme court increased the award to
$250.00 per week "in order to conform reasonably with the mode of living
that the husband has set for himself." One could well believe that the
wife was handsomely "rewarded" rather than "awarded" for her arduous
travail of six weeks of marriage!
Reduction of alimony because of bad moral behavior of ex-wife.-The
case of James v. James-9 which seemed to condition the right of the former
wife to receive alimony upon her continued good moral behavior seems
difficult to justify. The parties were divorced and the wife was awarded
alimony of $190.00 per month. In 1953 the lower court, upon petition of
the ex-husband, relieved him from future payments until "the further order
of this court" because the court found that the ex-wife had been living with
another man as "man and wife." In 1955, the ex-wife petitioned the lower
court to reinstate the 1948 order, vacate the 1953 amendatory order, and
increase the alimony to $250.00 a month. The supreme court held that
the 1953 order was res judicata unless obtained by fraud, collusion, deceit
or mistake. However, the wife did have the right for a re-examination by
the court as to her right to obtain alimony in the future "and to persuade
the court, if she can, that her misconduct in the past should not mitigate
against her right to recover alimony in the future." The writer does not
disagree with the res judicata aspect of the case. However, why the ex-wife's
living meretriciously with another man should cut off her right to alimony
is beyond the writer's understanding. If the former wife's living with the
other man was actually a common-law marriage there would be no question
that this marriage would destroy her right to continued alimony. However,
it is submitted that after a divorce and in the absence of children, neither
party should have any control, directly or indirectly, over the subsequent
moral behavior of the other spouse. If the paramour were actually supporting
the woman, then the issue should merely be one of economics, that is,
does the wife need alimony if she is being supported by another?
Lump-sum awards.-Although a Florida statute40 confers jurisdiction
upon a chancellor to order a lump-sum payment of alimony, the court
has heretofore held that this should not be done where it would unreas-
onably deplete the husband's financial position or endanger his economic
status.4 ' However, there are instances where some special equities might
make this advisable. Therefore, when a wife and her parents have helped
a husband to acquire property and the husband has demonstrated by past
conduct with other wives that he will fail to abide by alimony and support
orders, it is proper to compel him to deed property to the wife, one-half
39. 84 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1956).
40. FLA. STAT. § 65.08 (1947).
41. Yandell v. Yandell, 39 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1949).
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of the income therefrom to be charged for the support of the children of
the marriage.42
In the absence of a statute, a Florida court has no authority to award
lump-sum alimony in a separate maintenance suit or a suit for alimony
unconnected with divorce. However, the court stated that: 43
Although in a separate maintenance proceedings the property rights
of husband and wife in the income from estates by the entireties
may be adjusted, (White vs. White, Fla. 1949, 42 So.2d 710), we
have heretofore held that in such a proceeding a division of the
husband's property and transfer to the wife is not proper, even
though he might properly be required to provide living accommo-
dations for her. Randall v. Randall, 158 Fla. 502, 29 So.2d 238.44
In another case the chancellor awarded the wife $50,000.00 as lump-
sum alimony to be paid within two years; until the amount was paid she
was to receive $125.00 per week. The court held that these weekly payments
were not to be charged against the lump-sum award. The supreme court
modified the decree by awarding the wife interest at six per cent per annum
on the lump-sum from the date of the decree until paid, less the weekly
amounts actually paid and less "interest accrued thereon at the rate stip-
ulated when the lump-sum is ultimately paid."'34
Right to alimony as affected by divorce obtained on constructive serv-
ice.-For those lawyers who handle "migratory" uncontested divorce cases
and are therefore concerned over questions of alimony which may develop
in the future, two cases arc of special importance. In the first, a United
States Supreme Court decision, the Court was presented the following inter-
esting fact situation. A husband and wife were domiciled in Florida; later
the wife moved to Ohio and the husband filed suit for divorce in Florida.
Service upon the wife was made by publication and she did not appear
in the action. The Florida court entered a final decree of divorce, the perti-
nent part stating that the wife:
.. . has not come into this court in good faith or made any claim
to the equitable conscience of the court and has made no showing
of any need on her part for alimony. It is therefore, specifically
decreed that no award of alimony be made to the defendant ...
After the rendition of the decree, the Ohio courts awarded the ex-wife
alimony; the ex-husband claimed in the instant action that the Ohio courts
had not given full faith and credit to the Florida decree. The majority of
the Supreme Court held that the Florida court did not purport to adjudicate
42. Lindley v. Lindley, 84 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1955). The court cited section 65.14 of
the Florida Statutes as authority for the ordering of the conveyance as security for per-
formance of the award of alimony.
43. Bredin v. Bredin, 89 So.Zd 353 (Fla. 1956).
44. Id. at 356.
45. Williams v. Williams, 85 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1955).
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the question of alimony and did not deny her any; therefore the Ohio courts
had not failed to afford the Florida decree full faith and credit. The dis-
senting Justices stated that the decree was plainly a denial of alimony, not
because the court had left the matter open, but because the chancellor
thought that the wife should not have any alimony; therefore, there was
a direct conflict between the Ohio and Florida decrees. However, the dis-
senters stated that since the Florida court never obtained personal service
upon the wife, it did not have jurisdiction to enter a personal judgment
against the wife depriving her of right to alimony. Therefore the Ohio court
did not have to give full faith and credit to the Florida decree.46 In the
second case, the supreme court held in accord with the "divisible divorce"
theory enunciated in the Pawley4T case; a final decree of divorce granted
in Alabama upon constructive service dissolved the marriage, but did not
affect the rights of the wife under a pre-existing Florida separate main-
tenance decree. 48
Modification of alimony awards.- In McArthur v. McArthur" the
facts indicated that: the wife had about $5,000.00 in cash; she had out-
standing obligations of about $600.00; she was forced to give up working;
she was fifty-three years old; her husband paid income taxes in excess of
$50,000.00 in 1955; he had inherited $300,000.00 from his second wife and
had sold real property in excess of $1,000,000.00. She was held to have
shown a change in circumstances since the rendition of a former alimony
decree and to be entitled to more than fifty dollars a week alimony.
Division of pro perty.-In the absence of proof and pleadings, a chan-
cellor was not authorized to order a sale of property held as an estate by
the entirety with the proceeds, less expenses, to be distributed to one of
the parties.5 0
MISCELLANEOUS
Effect of decrees against non-parties to suit.-Since a corporation is a
"person" within the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution, the chancellor, in a divorce
suit, had no right to enter a judgment against a non-party corporation in
favor of the husband for money allegedly loaned to the corporation even
though the wife owned 498 shares out of 500 shares issued.51
Effect of re-marriage asserted as a bar to an appeal from a divorce
decree.-Although a husband who remarried, pending an appeal from a
divorce decree entered against him, was estopped to attack that part of
46. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956), petition for rehearing denied
351 U.S. 943 (1956).
47. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 866 (1950).
48. Sorrells v. Sorrells, 82 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1955).
49. 95 So.2d 521 (Fa. 1957).50. Holmes v. Holmes, 95 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1957).
51. Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1956).
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the decree dissolving the marriage, he was not estopped to question the
portions of the decree dealing with alimony, property rights, and attorney's
fees.52
Res-judicata.-A wife sued for alimony unconnected with divorce53
and her suit was dismissed because of her failure to prove that her husband
failed to support her or their children; she later filed suit for divorce which
also was dismissed for lack of proof. The chancellor had no authority to
award alimony because he already had determined the question adversely
to her. The court stated that an examination of the facts showed that the
wife had taken money from their joint bank account after the husband
had agreed that this money should be used to support her and their children;
hence he was not guilty of withholding support.54
PROPERTY AND TORTS
Cases involving property, torts, and insurance are discussed elsewhere
in this issue.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Criteria for award.-The defendant husband earned in excess of one
hundred dollars per week as a carpenter, had a very small bank account, and
was forced to borrow $1,000.00 from his employer to pay hospital bills, mort-
gage payments, doctor's bills, etc.; it was shown that the wife's assets were
slight. Under these circumstances the court reversed a lower court award of
$1,000.00 in fees to be paid to the wife's attorney, remanding the cause
to the lower court to determine what amount was "fit, equitable and just
in view of the circumstances of the parties." The court cautioned that every
record should contain evidence and recitals which support the fee awarded
so that there will be a basis upon which the supreme court can intelligently
weigh the judgment of the trial court. 5 However, in a later case the supreme
court awarded $250.00 to the wife's attorneys for their services rendered on
appeal without any indication as to the criterion used to award the sum.56
Where the husband had a bare subsistence for himself after making
contributions to the support of his children, the court refused to disturb
an award of $200.00 attorney's fees against the husband as inadequate, the
court stating that: 7
In the matter of the allowance of attorney's fees, it may be that
the amount allowed, $200.00, was inadequate. The criterion to
govern the allowance of attorney's fees in a divorce is 'from the
52. Weatherford v. Weatherford, 91 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1956).
53. FLA, STAT. § 65.10 (1941).
54. Egland v, Egland, 92 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1957).
55. Hryckowian v. Hryckowian, 82 So.2d 879 (FIa. 1955).
56. Collins v. Collins, 88 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1956).
57. Shephard v. Shephard, 87 So.2d 807 (Fla. 1956),
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circumstances of the parties and nature of the case may be fit,
equitable and just.' Section 65.08, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., Hry-
ckowian v. Hhychowian, Fla., 82 So.2d 879. In contested cases
what is 'fit, equitable and just' is at times beyond the reach of
of litigants to pay. In such cases the answer to the question is
determined by how much the traffic will bear and we cannot say
that the chancellor adduced a wrong answer to that question. Such
cases are often so unpleasant to litigate that attorneys refuse to
take them and it is doubtful if those who do are ever adequately
compensated. Such cases may be catalogued as liabilities of the
profession.58
When the husband petitioned the court to terminate a previous alimony
award, but did not press the matter, and the wife petitioned to increase
the previous award, she was not automatically entitled to attorney's fees
for contesting the ex-husband's petition because she was acting affirma-
tively; the matter was stated to be addressed to the discretion of the
court.50
CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
CUSTODY-ParentS v. grandparents and aunts.-The court decided
four cases which seem to indicate a possible trend towards making grand-
parents and aunts permanent "baby sitters." In the first case, 0 a mother
of two children aged twenty-one months and three days, died. Two weeks
later the husband left the children with their maternal grandparents in
Florida. Subsequently the father returned to Florida from California and
filed a writ of habeas corpus which was denied; the court awarded custody
to the maternal grandparents. At the same time the county judge ordered
the father to contribute to the support of his children. The father's petition
to the circuit court to modify its order was denied. The supreme court
affirmed, stating that it was in the best interests of the children to stay
with the grandparents. Although the father had not permanently relinquished
his right to enjoy the custody of his children; he would have to more clearly
demonstrate that the enjoyment of this right would be in the interest of
the children. Justice Drew, in a strong, well reasoned dissent, stated that
the court would not deprive the father of his children forever and that the
sooner the father regained custody, the less the injury to the grandparents
and the children.
In the second case6' the court affirmed a ruling of the chancellor, giving
custody of two minor children to the paternal grandparents, because the
children were well provided for, attended school and church regularly, were
well disciplined, and the children preferred living with them; the mother
was unstable and the father not too dependable.
58. Id. at 809.
59. McArthur v. McArthur, 95 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1957).
60. State ex rel. Sparks v. Reeves, 81 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1955).
61. Shephard v. Shephard, 87 So.2d 807 (Fla. 1956).
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In the third case,0 2 the special master recommended that three minor
children be awarded to the mother. The chancellor, without stating any
reasons in his decree, awarded the two youngest children to the mother, the
oldest child to the father, with custody to the father's mother when the
father was absent from home, which was approximately six months out of
each year. The supreme court reversed the chancellor and held that all three
children should be with the mother in order, among other things, to avoid
a further family separation.
In the fourth case 6 3 the court affirmed the action of the lower court
in taking the custody of a fifteen year old boy from his mother, and
giving it to the boy's paternal aunt, because the atmosphere of the home
of his mother and new step-father was intolerable to him. From this home
he emerged underweight, undernourished and weighing only seventy-nine
pounds at age fifteen. The court made some important procedural rulings
which are discussed in the following section. 4
Jurisdiction and procedure.-In another case, 5 apparently of first
impression in Florida, the court held that where the Volusia County circuit
court entered a divorce decree providing for the support of a minor child,
and subsequently the ex-husband mbved to Connecticut and the ex-wife
moved to Duval County, the Duval circuit court had jurisdiction when the
ex-wife filed proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Law. 8
In a proceeding brought to increase a support award, it was not neces-
sary for service of process to be made upon the defendant husband-father
since it was not a new action, but merely a continuation of the original
proceeding. All that was required was that he be given adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the decree was altered in a manner
that would directly affect his person, status or property; this would be
accomplished if a copy of the petition were mailed to him even though
he resided in a different state.67
It was erroneous for a chancellor to enter an order directing that ajuvenile officer take custody of children without any notice to the mother
(who in the instant case had received custody from the same chancellor
two years previously) pursuant to a petition which failed to allege that
notice would accelerate injury and which failed to provide any other excuse
or reason for failure to give notice to the mother.6 8
62. Arons v. Arons, 94 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1957).
63. Grant v. Corbitt, 95 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1957).
64. See Note 67 infra.
65. Thompson v. Thompson, 93 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1957).
66. Fla. Stat. § 88.011 (1955).
67. Watson v. Watson, 88 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1956).
68. Abney v. Abney, 84 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1956).
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A father petitioned for modification of a support award and the chan-
cellor denied the petition; the court did not reverse the ruling of the chan-
cellor because the father failed to accompany his petition with a certified
transcript of the record of the proceedings. The court was ignorant of the
testimony and could not accept the unverified averments of the petition,"a
In a case of first impression, the court held that a writ of attachment 0
ordering the sheriff to take a defendant father into custody and detain him
until he paid the amount of arrearages of a child support order was not the
proper remedy because:
So to apply it would substitute the arbitrary action of the rule for
contempt proceedings and thereby circumvent the protection ac-
corded a defendant under the Constitution by depriving him of the
opportunity to meet the charge before incarceration.21
In an opinion, which the writer feels is entirely unjust and tragic, the
court affirmed an award of custody of a minor daughter to her mother
whom the chancellor found to be guilty of numerous adulteries and of
extreme cruelty and quite unfit to have the custody of the child. The father,
although a fit person to have custody of the child, had no home in which
to raise her except with hired help who would be in complete charge during
his many absences. The court affirmed because the father failed to include
in his appellate appendix any testimony regarding the character of. the
wife and her fitness or unfitness to be guardian. The final decree itself stated
that the mother was unfit to have custody. If this were not considered
sufficient, the court should have, in the best interests of'the child, requested,
or ordered the father to produce the lacking testimony. This procedure
would admittedly be irregular, but when the court is dealing with the welfare
of helpless children it should not sacrifice them because of any inadvertence
of the father or his counsel. The opinion of the court granted on a petition
for re-hearing added nothing to the sagacity of the final decision. 2 The
court, in a later case involving custody of children, decided "to pass over
the technicalities of procedure and to dispose of the case upon its merits,"
and held that it was technically erroneous to grant temporary custody of a
child to his paternal aunt, who was not a party to the original divorce
proceedings (which occurred some eleven years previous to the instant
action)- he mother was given notice and an opportunity to be heard,
although she was given an opportunity to and did fully present her side
of the case before the final hearing. The court justified its "bending" of
the rules because "it is well settled that the welfare of the child is the
paramount consideration in cases of this kind." The court further held that
even though the legal domicile of the child may have been in Georgia (the
69. Connolly v. Connolly, 86 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1956).
70. Fla. R. C. P. (1954) r. 3.15.
71. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 80 So.2d 464, 165 (Fla. 1955).
72. Widett v. Widett, 88 So2d 769 (Fla. 1956).
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home of the mother) the fact that the child presently resided in Florida
gave the Florida court jurisdiction. 3
Duration and modification of child support awards.-The financial
ability of a father to pay more than a previous court award for the support
of a minor child was held not the sole criterion. While the father's financial
ability was undoubtedly a substantial factor, there were other elements, such
as: the actual needs of the child, the advisability of spending more than
a certain amount in the maintenance of the child, the general living con-
ditions available to the child, and his station in life.74
In accord with the case of Guinta v. Lo Re,75 a decree which ordered
monthly payments for the support of a minor child did not survive the
death of the father when he, by a will, disinherited the child. The dis-
senting opinion stated that the Guinta case should be overruled because
today there is very little similarity between the child support laws of Eng-
land and Florida. In England the father was not legally obligated to support
his child even during the father's lifetime; the whole statutory and judicial
policy of Florida is just the opposite, the dissenters stating that:
It seems to me illogical to hold that as the father under English
law is not legally bound to support his minor children and his
estate is not accountable after his death, still the English law is
applicable after the death of the father although in this state he
is legally bound to support his minor children before his death.76
If the earning ability of a father decreased since the entry of a previous
child support award, and one of the children has since become employed,
the earnings of the child should be considered in determining the need of
the child and the father's ability to pay.77
Important legislative enactments.-Section 65.141 of the Florida Sta-
tues was amended 8 by adding two sections which make it unlawful for any
person with criminal intent to remove a child from the state without
permission during the pendency of any suit affecting custody of the child
after the person receives notice of the suit or fails to return a child who
was removed with court permission. It is submitted that this statute should
prove more effective than the usual temporary injunction or restraining
order.
Miscellaneous legislative erctments.-Section 391.07 of the Florida
Statutes was amended79 by repealing the provision requiring the juvenile
73. Crant v. Corbitt, 95 So2d 25 (Pa. 1957).
74. Brown v. Brown, 84 So2d 311 (Fla. 1956).
75. 159 Fla. 488, 31 So.2d 704 (1947).
76. Flagler v. flagler, 94 So2d 592, 596 (Fa. 1957).
77. Eisinger v. Eisinger, 95 So2d 502 (Fla. 1957).
78. FLA. STAT. § 65.141 (1955), as amended by e. 57-337, H.B. 637, 36th Regular
Session, Florida (1957).
79. FLA. STAT. § 391.07 (1941), as amended by c. 57-215, SB. 522, 36th Regular
Session, Florida (1957).
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court to detemine the financial ability of parents to pay for medical care
and treatment of indigent crippled children and vesting such determination
in the Crippled Children's Commission.
Section 88.151 of the Florida Statutes was amended80 by specifying
who shall defray the costs and court fees under the reciprocal support
laws.
SEPARATION AGREEMENTs
Indirect attack.-A separation agreement, which was later incorporated
in a divorce decree, provided that the husband and wife should each receive
a one-half undivided interest in property being purchased under a contract
for deed and that the husband should pay the balance of the payments. The
husband, after the divorce, brought suit for partition alleging that he was
"uncertain" about his rights under the contract. The suit was dismissed
because the court refused to sanction the disturbance of the divorce decree
by this indirect method.81
Reduction in alimony caused by husband's voluntary diminution in
income.-A husband was not barred from applying for a reduction in an
alimony award based upon a separation agreement where necessity for the
change was brought about by voluntary action on his part (he moved his
medical practice from Georgia to Florida with a resulting decrease in income)
even though he had capital assets to meet, at least for a time, the obliga-
tion. The court was careful to point out that if the separation agreement
were in fact a settlement of property rights, that is, if the wife had
relinquished special equities in her husband's business or the legal title to
property held as tenants by the entirety in consideration for the husband's
promise to pay the wife a stipulated sum per month, then the husband
could be required to meet the contractual obligation even though it must
be met from his capital assets rather than from his income.8
2
Duration of alimony under separation agreement.-Under a separation
agreement which provided:
That the said payments to the plaintiff, as provided in paragraph
numbered '5' hereof (weekly payments of twenty-five dollars per
week to the wife), shall cease, upon the death of the plaintiff or
upon her re-marriage to any person other than the defendant....
the majority of the court held that since this agreement expressly provided
for the continuance of the payments "until the death of the wife" his estate
remained liable for the obligation in the same manner as it would be for any
80. FLA. STAT. § 88.151 (1955), as amended by c. 57-405, S.B. 512, 36th Regular
Session, Florida (1957).
81. Fisher v. Davenport, 84 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1956).
82. Fort v. Fort, 90 So2d 313 (Fla. 1956).
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other legitimate obligation. The well documented dissenting opinion stated
that the obligation to make weekly payments should cease.
unless by the terms and covenants of the separation agreement
the husband, by express language which admits of no doubt,
makes his obligation binding upon his estatef.8
Setting aside separation agreements.-A wife testified that she and
her husband had lived on a lavish scale, spending approximately $40,000.00
a year for living expenses. The master at the divorce hearing fully questioned
her about her understanding of the agreement and she was properly repre-
sented. The court held that she could not but be aware of her husband's
financial status and that she had failed to sustain the burden of showing
that the agreement was obtained by her husband's alleged fraudulent repre-
sentations regarding his financial condition.8 4
Effect of non-specific clause on a tenancy by the entirety.-A clause in
a property settlement stipulation provided that:
The said Rosalie Schrammel hereby releases, relinquishes and waives
any and all other claims, dower rights or other rights she might
have against the plaintiff, Frank Schrammel. 5
This did not constitute a tranference by the wife to her husband of
any independent property right which she had in an estate by the entirety,
because the interest of a wife in an estate by the entirety is not a "claim"
or "right" against her husband. In the absence of any provision in the
divorce decree to the contrary, the parties became tenants in common.80
ADOPTION
Inasmuch as there is no statutory age limit in Florida for petitioners
for adoption, the mere fact that the adopting father and mother were fifty-
seven and fifty-three years old respectively would not, without more, bar
an adoption. The fact that the petitioning mother was a "Psychic Reader"
would not bar the adoption when it did not disturb the child. The remainder
of the testimony showed that the natural mother consented to the adoption;
a decree pro confesso was entered against the natural father; and that the
adopting parents were fit. It seems very strange that the State Welfare Board
reported that the petitioning parents were unfit and that the child should
be committed to the Department of Public Welfare for further planning.8 7
In accord with the age aspect of the foregoing case, the court held
that although a husband and wife were forty-eight and sixty-three years,
83. Johnson v. Every, 93 So.2d 390, 396 (Fla. 1957).
84. Cower v. Cower, 95 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1957).
85. Quick v. Leatherman, 96 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 1957).
86. Ibid.
87. In re Brown's Adoption, 85 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1956).
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old respectively, and had a limited annual income of "considerably more
than $3,000.00," the chancellor abused his discretion in denying their
adoption of a two and a half year old girl who had been in their custody
for approximately one year. The adopting parents were in good health,
wanted and loved this child, provided a good environment for her, and
that "One with ten times the income and much younger might not be
near so good a risk." Two justices dissented, and the writer confesses his
inability to find one concrete reason stated justifying the dissent.88
Procedure.-When the consent of the natural mother to adoption
was obtained by fraud, duress or both, the child was not a proper subject
for adoption proceedings.8 9
It was error for the court to take judicial notice of what may be con-
tained in the record of another distinct case unless it were bought to the
attention of the court by being made a part of the rocord. However,
when no testimony was recorded on a hearing for an interlocutory decree
of adoption the court held it was unable to say that the lower court
improperly took notice of other proceedings both civil and criminal. The
presumption is that the lower court committed no error which was not
rebutted by the appellants.90
Inheritance by adopted child.-Section 72.22 of the Florida Statutes
was amended9 to provide that when an adopted child has been subse-
quently adopted by some third party, or re-adopted by another or his natural
parents, the child will not inherit from the first adopting parent in the
absence of some evidence in writing that such first adopting parent con-
sidered such child his child for the purposes of inheritance, notwithstanding
the subsequent adoption.
GUARDIANSHIP AND GUARDIANS AD LrEEM
Gifts to minors.-The legislature has enacted the Florida Gifts to
Minors Act92 which prescribes the methods, procedures, rights and liabilities
incurred in the making of. gifts of money and securities to minors. The act is
well drawn in that it seems to have been enacted, in part, to circumvent the
rigidity, technicality, and expense of the guardianship laws.
Compensation of guardian.-A legally appointed guardian who properly
performed his duties was entitled to compensation to be awarded by the
court despite a contention that the guardian was a law clerk for a law partner-
ship and was therefore a "mere nominee or dummy." The fact that the law
88. In Te Duke, 95 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1957).
89. In re Adoption of Shea, 86 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1956).
90. In re Freeman's Adoption, 90 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1956).
91. FLA. STAT. § 72.22 (1943), as amended by c. 57-158, H.B. No. 690, 36th Regu-
lar Session, Florida (19571.
92. Chapter 57-53, S.B. No. 26, 36th Regular Session, Florida (1957).
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clerk worked for a salary would not thereby entitle his employers to the
guardianship fees. The court pointed out that if one's estate could be
handled in the alleged manner, then the probate court could "farm out"
the administration of every estate that comes within its jurisdiction, but
the law does not so comtemplate 53
Guardian ad litem.-In a case of first impression under the Florida
Civil Procedure Rules,94 the court held that failure to appoint a guardian
ad litem rendered a judgment against a minor voidable only, not void.
Therefore, the judgment was not subject to collateral attack, but was subject
to a direct attack if the incompetent defendant had a meritorious defense
and was not properly represented.95
ILLEGITIMACY
Inheritance by illegitimate child. The Florida Statutes8 requires
two things to be proved to enable an illegitimate child to inherit
from his putative father, namely: paternity and a written acknowledgment
of paternity by the father made in the presence of a competent witness. In the
event that the written acknowledgment has been lost, it may be established
by secondary evidence under the general rules relating to the admissibility
of secondary evidence of lost or destroyed writings. In the instant case the
court held that a simple letter written by the alleged father if it directly,
unequivocally and unquestionably acknowledged the paternity of the ille-
gitimate child, was sufficient, provided it was written in the presence of
(meaning to the knowledge of) the witness. The putative father must have
been conscious of the fact that the writing was made within the knowledge
of the witness. The court held that the explanation of the loss of the letter
was doubtful, but decided the case adversely to the claimant upon the
grounds that the testimony of the person who allegedly witnessed the writing
of the letter was insufficient to prove its existence. 7
Effect of pleading the fifth amendment by defendant.-A defendant in
a bastardy proceeding may refuse to answer questions in a deposition by
pleading his privilege against self-incrimination and he will not be subject
to a summary judgment against him, provided he has other competent
evidentiary support for his counter-affidavit filed in opposition to the motion.
However, when his own testimony is all that he has to offer, and he
forestalls testifying by asserting his constitutional privilege, then his affidavit
has no competent evidentiary support and summary judgment may follow.98
93. In re Guardianship of Krell, 85 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1956).
94. Fla. R. C. P. (1954) r. 1.17 (b).
95. Savage v. Rowell Distributing Corp., 95 So.2d 415 (Ma. 1957).
96. FLA STAT. § 731.29 (1955).
97. In re McCollurn's Estate, 88 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1956).
98. Jones v. Stoutenburgh, 91 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1957).
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The Florida courts, when asked to restore an infant to his natural
mother, are not bound by mere legal right of parent or guardian. The courts
are not bound to deliver a child into the custody of the claimant, but should,
after a careful consideration of the facts, leave the child in such custody as the
welfare of the child at that time appears to require.99
Legitimizing child by marriage of parents.-The legislature has wisely
added a statute which provides that the marriage of the mother and putative
father of a bastard child at any time after its birth legitimizes the child; upon
the payment of all court costs and attorneys' fees a pending bastardy action
shall be dismissed. The record of such proceedings shall be sealed against
public inspection in the interests of the child.100
JUVENILES AND JUVENILE COURTS
Conflicts between juvenile and circuit courts.-It was the apparent
theory of the legislature that juvenile courts, with supposed skill in child
custody matters, could more effectively decide cases involving children than
could the chancery courts. However, it is the view of the writer that with
the apparent conflicts of jurisdiction between the courts these acts, instead
of being a panacea, have developed into a carcinoma. An example of the
foregoing is the Watson"' case. A divorce decree was entered in 1954, and
custody of three minor children was awarded to the mother. In April, 1955,
the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over the children as dependants and
placed them in the custody and control of their grandfather. A few days
later the circuit court entered an order which restrained the mother from
removing the children and ordered them to be held by the aforesaid grand-
father. Subsequently the juvenile court adjudicated the children as depend-
ants and placed them with their father under the supervision of a court
counselor. Despite the latter order, the circuit court authorized the mother
to visit the children three mornings a week and to have the children visit
her on Tuesday of each week. On June 6, the circuit court, without notice
or hearing, directed the grandfather to deliver the children to the mother.
On June 14, the circuit court ruled that it had jurisdiction and directed the
grandfather to place custody of the children with their mother on Thursday
of each week. Faced with this conflict between the courts, the supreme
court held that the circuit court had jurisdiction of the estate and interests
of minor children when brought into a divorce suit and that the-circuit
court could adjudicate their estates and interests at any time the circum-
stances warranted or the condition of the minor children so required. The
juvenile court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate such "estate and interests,"
particularly their "estates," and the constitution is silent as to any intent
99. Arnd't v. Prose, 94 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1957).
100 FLA. STAT. § 742.091 (1957), as amended by c. 57-267, H.B. No. 393, 36th
Regular Session, Florida (1957).
101. Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 39.14 (1955).
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to clothe them with such jurisdiction. The court stated that in some states
the juvenile court may acquire jurisdiction over the children of divorced
parents who later become "dependent" or "delinquent," but that the law
of Florida does not so provide.
Scope of appellate review.-Whcn an order of the juvenile court was
appealed to the circuit court 02 and the case was brought to the supreme
court by a petition for certiorari, the scope of review by the court was
limited to a determination of the question whether the juvenile court
misinterpreted the legal effect of the evidence as a whole or whether in
some fashion it departed from the essential requirements of the law. 03 The
Hauser' 4 case is another case which illustrates the writer's opening remarks
in this section. However, so as not to belabor the point, the facts of the
case which show the shuttling back and forth of the case between the circuit
court and the juvenile court are omitted. The ultimate holding was that
the judgment of a circuit court (acting as an intermediate appellate court)
which merely reversed the judgment of the juvenile court and remanded the
case for further proceedings consistent with the ruling of the circuit court
is not a final judgment that will support review by certiorari in the supreme
court. The one exception to the foregoing rule is:
... where the judgment of the Circuit Court reverses the judgment
of an inferior court in such fashion and with such directions that
would require the inferior court to proceed in violation of the
essential requirements of the law should it abide by the judgment
of the intermediate appellate Circuit Court.'
Attorney can not waive parents' rights to their children.-A juvenile
court had jurisdiction over the natural parents and over the child and
ordered the child temporarily committed to a licensed child-placing agency
and reserved jurisdiction over the matter to make other orders "as may from
time to time be necessary." It could not later, without giving notice to the
parents, permanently commit the child to a licensing agency for adoption
unless they executed before two witnesses and a notary public, or other
officer authorized to take acknowledgments, a written surrender of the child
to a licensed child-placing agency.108 A waiver of notice by the parents'
attorney was not within the general scope of an attorney's authority to waive
mere procedural requirements. Involved was a substantial right that could
only be waived in the manner provided for in the statute. 1 7
luvenile court trials now open to the public.-The legislature has finally
ripped away the iron curtain surrounding juvenile court trials by providing
102. Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 39.14 (1955),
103. Noeling v. Florida, 87 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1956).
104. Hauser v. Hauser, 93 So.ld 865 (Fla. 1957).
105. Id. at 867.
106. Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 39.11 (D.E. 1955).
107. See note 97 supra.
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that they are to be open to the public except in cases involving unwed
mothers, custody or placement of illegitimate children, and "when the
public interest or the welfare of the child in the opinion of the judge is
best served by so doing."'0 8 It is submitted that this act subjecting juvenile
delinquents to the white glare of publicity may do more to curb them than
the former rule of secrecy. On the other hand, some delinquents seem to
thrive upon notoriety. Only time will tell.
Interstate compact on juveniles.-In an attempt to cope with the
problems of modem day "Huckleberry Finns," the legislature has enacted
the Interstate Compact on Juveniles' 8 which provides the procedures in-
volved in the return of interstate juvenile runaways, escapees, and absconders.
Child labor laws.-The child labor laws were extensively amended as
to minimum ages of employment, types of employment, hours of work, etc. 110
MISCELANEOUS
Ne exeat bond.-A ne exeat bond was conditioned only upon continued
presence of the principal within the state and his obedience to lawful orders
and decrees of the court; therefore when the surety produced the principal
in open court and requested release of the bond the chancellor had no other
alternative but to discharge the surety. It was therefore improper to order
that a portion of the bond be retained to secure the payment of court costs
and attorney's fees."'
Divorce advertising.-Section 454.33 of the Florida Statutes which
forbade any person from advertising that divorces could be procured by
such person was repealed." 2 It is a pity that hundreds of other similarly
useless laws could not be repealed in future sessions.
108. FxA. STAT. § 39.09 (1951), as amended by c. 57-257, S.B. No. 60, 36th Regu-
lar Session, Florida (1957).
109. FLA. STAT. § 39.25 (1957, c. 57-298, S.B. No. 475, 36th Regular Session, flor-
ida (1957).
110. FL. STAT. § 450.011 (1953), as amended by c. 57-224, S.B. No. 676, 36th Reg-
ular Session, Florida (1957).
111. Aiken v. Aiken, 81 So.2d 757 (Fla. 1955).
112. FL. STAT. § 454.33 (1941), as repealed by c. 57-39, H.B. No. 146, 36th Regu-
lar Session, orida (1957).
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